Former deputy director of the State Department's counterterrorism office during the Gulf War, Larry Johnson, told the magazine that car bombs, assassinations and hostage taking were "likely scenarios."
The magazine also spoke to "unnamed counterterrorism officials" who said that over 30 teams of terrorists, each team consisting of 2 to 3 men had been dispatced by Baghdad in 1991 and indicated that similar attacks may take place against U.S. interests again in 1998. (Athough, those in the intelligence community were said to be split during this time period as to whether or not Iraq had already dispatched similar teams of terrorists at this point.) The men, who were disguised as businessmen, used Iraq's diplomatic pouches to move automatic weapons, explosives and timers to embassies around for planned attacks.
Many of the attacks in 1991 were said to have been averted by a combination of U.S. intelligence efforts and the incompetence of Iraq's terrorist proxies.
David E. Kaplan, Bruce B. Auster and Douglas Pasternak, USNews & World Report, 3-2-98
Was Iraq's ability to conduct terrorist attacks destroyed by the mass expulsion of it's diplomats/agents from various countries and the attacks on it's intelligence facilities in 1993?
Damaged, but not destroyed.
By the end of 1993, Iraq was had already succeeded in placing agents abroad to track enemies of the regime, in addition to conducting attacks on Kuwaiti targets in Lebanon (including the Kuwaiti embassy), attacks on Kurdish targets in Northern Iraq and attacks on international workers throughout Iraq. 1994 State Department: Patterns of Global Terrorism,1993.
In 1994, "Iraq continued to engage in state-sponsored internal and international terrorism in 1994. It is rebuilding its ability to mount terrorist attacks abroad, despite financial and diplomatic constraints imposed in the wake of the Gulf war." State Department : Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1994.
1995 saw more rebuilding of Iraq's ability to sponsor terrorism. "Although Iraq's terrorist infrastructure has not recovered from the blows it suffered during the Gulf war, Baghdad has taken measures to restore its terrorist options." State Department: Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1995.
1996 was further rebuilding of Iraq's terror capabilities. State Department: Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1996.
In 1997 and 1998, Iraq's international terrorist network reportedly grew even further. State Department: Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1997. State Department: Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1998.
It appears that Johnson and others had good reason to worry about Iraq's terrorist capabilities in 1998. The Iraqi regime had expressed the desire and ability to rebuild at least some of its terrorist infrastructurere over the previous 5 years and by 1999 was ready to perform a major attack in Europe through its diplomatic (embassies) and intelligence agents. State Department: Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1999.