- Samir Vincent's ongoing court case exemplifies the underreported story of Saddam Hussein's agents who were operating inside the United States in the years prior to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.

Vincent's trial involves the Oil for Food scandal and implicates the Iraqi agent in attempting to buy off pro-Iraq (pre-invasion) sentiments within the U.S. government and the United Nations on behalf of Baghdad. The FBI's press release details Vincent's admission of guilt as an unregistred Iraqi agent and is available here.

- Another recently concluded trial is that of Shaaban Hafiz Ahmad Ali Shaaban (pictured right).

Shaaban, who had met with Mukhabarat agents in Iraq in 2002, was convicted for acting as an "unregistered agent for the Saddam Hussein regime" inside the United States. In the years before his capture, Shaaban had:

traveled to Baghdad in late 2002 where he offered to sell names of U.S. intelligence agents and operatives to Iraq for $3 million dollars.

sought to gain Iraqi support to establish an Arabic television station in the United States that would broadcast news and discussions that would be pro-Iraqi.

sought to enter into a "Cooperation Agreement" where he would be paid a fee by Iraq to organize volunteers to act as human shields to protect Iraqi infrastructure during the war.

broadcasted messages of support for the Iraqi government on Iraqi media stations that advocated support for Iraq and encouraged others to forcibly resist the United States and others who opposed Iraq.

- The case of accused Iraqi sleeper agent, Sami Latchin, is currently in recess.

- Susan Lindauer, another alleged IIS agent operating in the United States, is currently in a Texas mental hospital. She has been relegated to the facility until she is mentally fit to stand trial. Lindauer is said to have been attempting to influence U.S. policy on Iraq, acting as an Iraqi agent on behalf of Saddam Hussein and possibly collaborating with Iraqi "resistance" post-invasion. More information on Lindauer's case here and here.

- The human rights trial of Saddam Hussein, and top members of his former regime, ceased Thursday until mid-October.
- Iraq's Central Criminal Court also continues to prosecute insurgents and terrorists captured in Iraq, many of whom are members of the former regime.

To the victims of the former regime's violence and terror, it may be of some small comfort to see that the members of Saddam Hussein's regime may finally be seeing justice for their crimes.

FrontPage magazine put together a symposium for its online magazine to discuss recent updates of what's been found in post-Saddam Iraq. Thomas Joscelyn, Michael Ledeen, Andrew McCarthy and Dave Gaubatz all voiced disapointment at the speed and lack of attention the efforts have recieved from elected officials, the intelligence community and the press.

The symposium can be read here.

FrontPage also put together a similar symposium in February 2005 to discuss updates on Saddam Hussein's possible links with al Qaeda. The back and fourth between Laurie Mylroie, Deroy Murdock, Rohan Gunaratna and Robert Leiken gives the public a good gauge of what both sides of the argument have to say about the issue.

My piece on Saddam Hussein's possible links to Islamic terrorists in the Kashmir region, "Indian Islamist terror group had ties to Saddam", is now up at Insight magazine's website.

Thanks to Laurie Mylroie and others who passed along relevant information for the story.

Saddam Hussein's former right-hand man, and most wanted man in Iraq, Izzat al-Douri, recently relayed a number of messages to TIME magazine through intermediaries. Some of his responses, which TIME contends were verified through trusted sources, shed some light on leading terrorist in Iraq's postwar activities.

Although al-Douri rebuked many of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's tactics he renewed his praise of the deceased al Qaeda leaders "courage, the strength of his faith, and the sacrifices of his fighters" and admitted participating with Zarqawi and sharing his religious views.

Unless al Douri's religious views radically altered post-invasion (unlikely considering al Douri's history of extreme religious views and participation in Iraq's "Return to Faith Campaign"), this admission severely damages the argument that Saddam Hussein's regime was hostile to radical, militant Islam.

al-Douri went on to say that the military plan for the initial stages for the war had been a mistake and that Iraq's military would have been much more effective (at killing Americans and innocent Iraqis) if they had disbanded and used their entire force to fight in a guerilla war, as the remnants of the military had done. al-Douri also said that the military holdovers from the previous regime had been responsible for 95% of the attacks on coalition forces, indicating that the war against the previous regime continues to be the primary obstacle for peace in Iraq.

Sachin Parashar, of The Times of India, is reporting that the American embassy in India is on heightened alert amid reports of an impending terror attack.

The attack is reportedly scheduled to take place before July 30 by a 20-man cell. The cell is described as an "Iranian terror group" made up of Iranian, Afghan and Kashmiri nationals, armed with sophisticated weaponry.

What is noteworthy about this report is not only that the unnamed terror group is said to have previously "backed" Saddam Hussein but that the warning for the attack was gathered, at least in part, from captured members of al Qaeda in Pakistan.

It is possible that the "Iranian group" in question is the formerly Iraq-based terror group MKO, though their previous attacks have primarily been directed at the post-Shah regime of Iran.

Therefore, the members, goals and background of the Iranian group in question, as well as the nature of their "backing" of Saddam Hussein are interesting questions that deserve answers. The arrest and capture of this terror cell, by Indian and/or American forces, would be a necessary step in answering those questions.

Regarding al Qaeda, the devastating simultaneous embassy attacks in Africa in 1998 and the attack on the U.S. consulate in Jeddah in 2004 exemplify their extensive background in such attacks, and thus the intelligence gained from al Qaeda detainees may indicate that the attacks are, at least partially, al Qaeda sponsored. Groups affiliated with al Qaeda in the Kashmir region include Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad , meaning that al Qaeda's knowledge of an impending attack is not unlikely.

The latest Harris Poll (hat tip Ray Robison) has some interesting results on public opinions of Saddam Hussein's possible links to al Qaeda.

Of those Americans polled, 64% agree that Saddam Hussein had "strong" links to al Qaeda.

Hussein's latest claim of innocence (below) is not convincing the American public opinion, as the percentage of Americans who believe the two groups had "strong" links has remained fairly steady for over a year.

In Saddam Hussein's latest letter to the American people, he urges U.S. withdrawal from Iraq because of his professed innocence on a number of issues.

In the letter Hussein claims Iraq did "not have any ties to so-called terrorism." Of course Hussein's Iraq certainly had extensive ties to terrorism and thus had been listed on the State Department's annual list of State Sponsors of Terrorism for over a decade.

Hussein further noted that "no Iraqi took part in the events of 11 September!?" The nationality of those who carried out the 9-11 attacks is a matter of public record and the need for revamped post 9-11 security measures was cited far more often than the accusation that Hussein directed or took part in the 9-11 attacks.

Hussein acknowledged that Iraq was one of few countries not to offer condolensces to the U.S. post 9-11. (In fact Iraq's state-run media praised the attacks) His latest reasoning for not sending a letter of condolence regarding the attacks was because "American planes were striking targets in Iraq and destroying public and private property," referencing the American pilots enforcing the U.N. mandated no-fly zones in Iraq.

Despite many of his own representatives indicating cooperation between the two sides took place Saddam has long denied the charge that he was linked to al Qaeda.

If we had a relationship with Al-Qaida and we believed in that relationship we wouldn't be ashamed to admit it. Therefore I would like to tell you directly and also through you to anyone who is interested to know that we have no relationship with Al Qaeda.

The reasoning behind the conditional of "(if) we believed in that relationship we wouldn't be ashamed to admit it" is uncertain. If there was no relationship to speak of why condition the circumstances in which it would be admitted? Hussein may have also been letting Benn know that he was in charge of the interview and would only reveal information that he felt like revealing or he could have just been lying.

Is this the basis of the anxiety in the minds of U.S. officials? Or is it the basis of anxiety in the minds of the people of the United States? ... This issue, this topic did not appear…amongst the concerns of U.S. officials until - that is, about any relationship between Iraq and Osama bin Laden -- until recently.

The notion that U.S. officials had not expressed concern about a possible relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda until shortly before the war is not true and certainly Saddam Hussein was aware of this.

The Clinton administration's concern about links between the two sides was widely reported and discussed in 1998 and 1999 in both the domestic and international media. Air strikes on the Sudanese pharmaceutical plant al-Shifa were justified, in part, by the dangers of a deadly WMD nexus between Sudan, Iraq and al Qaeda.

Saddam Hussein's testimony regarding his links to al Qaeda and other terrorists, via letter and interviews, continues to be interesting reading but his history of dishonesty and deception indicate that his word on such matters is of little value in terms of discovering the truth.

The case of Sami Latchin, a former Mukhabarat agent for Saddam Hussein arrested in the Chicagoland area for being an alleged Iraqi sleeper agent, continued today as Latchin's agents appealed to a federal judge for access to records of possible NSA wiretaps of Latchin's communications.

In "United States of America v. Sami Khoshab Latchin" federal prosecutors charged Mr. Latchin with lying to U.S. officials about his affiliations with Saddam Hussein's regime.

More background on Latchin's case is available at Captain's Quarters and The Pink Flamingo.

Radio Polonia is reporting reporting that Polish Intelligence agents have captured an Iraqi terrorist wanted for a number of terrorist attacks, including the fatal attack on a Polish public televsion war correspondant and his assistant.

The background of that wanted terrorist, Salas Khabbas, is what is most interesting.

Polish reports suggest that Khabbas, who has "a long record of killings and kidnappings" and is "a former member of the Baath party and closely linked with al-Qaeda, specialized in attacking convoys and kidnapping."

Khabbas may reveal his exact role in the former regime to his captors as well as how and when he became "closely linked" with al-Qaeda. In the meantime, his name has been added to the ever-growing list of former regime officials caught fighting as al Qaeda agents in Iraq.

Dan Darling has brought attention to some details from a recent article in the Algerian publication L'Expression regarding Algerian jihadist activity in pre-invasion Iraq. (This story was also reported by Stephen Hayes in a January 2006 Weekly Standard column titled "Saddam's Terror Training Camps". Revelations from the past six months have given additional support to Hayes' story.)

The article titled "Jihadist Algerians in Iraq: The 'Syrian Networks'" by Faycal Oukac cites Egyptian specialist Dia Rachwane on how and when many Algerian jihadis made their way into the country.

The Arab fighters' entry into Iraq happened before the American invasion, and several hundred fighters were on the ground before the fall of Saddam's regime, such as, for example, the Ansar el-Islam group to which Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi belonged before joining Al-Qa'ida. The fighters with the Arab legions arrived

The training of foreign suicide bombers, by the former regime, is also the topic of an official Iraqi government document (ISGP-2003-00028868) recovered post-invasion. The document, translated by Joseph Shahda, discusses the training of "Estishehadeyeen", which Shahda translated as meaning “Suicide Martyrs.” The memo, according to Shahda, also reveals that the suicide bombers were foreign and not Iraqi because "The Iraqi Feedaeyeens are known as “Feedaeyeen Saddam” so not to confuse between the two groups." The training instructions for the "Estishehadeyeen" include "how to become suicide bombers by using their own bodies, or suicide bombers using cars and motorcycles full of explosive."

It is also worth noting that Algerian jihadis were even among the fighters that reporters witnessed in a Baghdad training camp before the invasion, just as Saddam Hussein and his top lieutenants had claimed.

Okac's next words further support the claim that many of the Algerian and other foreign fighters came at the behest of the former regime (and al Qaeda leadership):

The fighters with the Arab legions arrived, some following instructions from the Al-Qa'ida leadership, some on their own initiative......As Ali Moussa Mahmud, the communications officer with the Iraqi embassy, emphasized at the time, 'these young people are only giving evidence of their support for the mother of Arab-Muslim civilization'....Tariq Aziz, one of the Iraqi regime's heavyweights, said that "the suicide attacks are a response to this rain of missiles." More than 5,000 foreign volunteers for the fight against "the American aggression" were already in Iraq. Others continued to arrive. The support from these activists was not symbolic. Whether fighters or providing logistical support, they opposed the American hegemony, thus boosting national and religious feelings.....'This war is an act of aggression against all Muslims,' Naji Sabri, the Iraqi foreign affairs minister, exclaimed. Saddam said a prayer, lifted both hands to ask for Allah's help, and added something to the Iraqi flag, which would be emblazoned with an Allah Akbar, which went around the world, and ended up convincing young jihadists to follow Saddam...

Which members of al Qaeda's leadership were instructing foreign fighters and jihadists to enter Iraq before March 2003 is an interesting question. Possibly Saif al Adel, Zarqawi or new al Qaeda in Iraq chief Abu Ayyub al-Masri.

Translated documents of the former regime, foreign fighters captured on the battlefield alongside Iraqi forces and the testimony of Middle East sources all indicate that Saddam Hussein and a number of his top officials invoked the call for a holy war and called on (and recruited and trained) jihadist fighters from throughout the Arab to fight against the U.S. pre-invasion.

These prewar requests were made and answered by a large number of Algerians (to say nothing of who was recruited from other countries) who coupled with members of his own regime to fight a 3+ year guerilla war against U.S. and coalition troops.

Thomas Joscelyn has pointed out another example of collusion between Saddam Hussein regime and al Qaeda linked fighters. This cooperation took place in the opening days of Operation Iraqi Freedom and numerous Chechens have been picked up on the battlefield over the past three years.

Joscelyn cites a FrontPage article which notes that among the recovered bodies of the fanatics fighting alongside Saddam Hussein's forces were numerous Chechens.

Kuwait News Agency has reported that Rashid Taan Kadhim, #6 on the recent most wanted list in Iraq, has been captured in recent raids.

Kadhim is a "member of the regional leadership of the dissolved Baath Party" and was wanted for "financing terrorist operations in Diyala province".

Incidentally, the Diyala province is also where Abu Musab al Zarqawi spent his final days before being killed by U.S. air strikes.

Captain's Quarters has posted the translation of what appears to be an Iraqi Intelligence Services (Mukhabarat) document discussing the use of diplomatic privileges to carry out terrorist attacks.

The 2003 document (CMPC-2003-005745.pdf) mentions (among other terrorist and sabotaging techniques) using a briefcase bomb that can make it through a security check.

Use of diplomatic briefcases as an explosive device that can not be detected by an X ray device

The use of Iraqi embassies and diplomats to carry out attacks has been a tool of the former regime since at least the first Gulf war when many of their diplomats were ejected from their posts in various countries for attempting attacks. Their embassies also played a vital role in the attempted attacks on the Radio Free Europe building in Prague, the preparations for terror attacks in 98 during a near war with the Clinton administration and various attacks during the leadup to the current war.

These suitcase bombs may have been involved in the attempted IIS attacks in Yemen, Jordan and elsewhere during the leadup to the current war or may have been for other yet-to-discovered attempted attacks.

My piece on the numerous detainees/defectors now in custody who have said al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's regime cooperated, at least in some capacity, is now up at FrontPage magazine.

CNN Photo of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan

The value of Ray Robison's recent piece for FOXNews.com can be better evaluated by reviewing other events from the same time period that are available through open sources. For instance, much is known about Iraq’s motives and position at the time. Particularly, in 1998-99, Iraq was the subject of ongoing international attempts to inspect the country for WMD’s and the U.S. State Dept. and others revealed that internal and external pressures had laid the foundation for Iraq’s desire to rebuild its international terrorist infrastructure. The topic of Iraq’s motivations is a topic and article unto itself, so for now I will refer readers to a previous post in which I reviewed some of those factors.
The Taliban’s hosting of al Qaeda had also brought international pressures on Afghanistan that hadn’t previously existed. Both parties were under increasing U.N./U.S. led international pressure and may have had increased motivation for cooperation at the time.

Regarding the actual document, one of the first things that jump out is the author’s determination in keeping the nature of the work secret. Although the “Arab” government mentioned in the document is unknown, Iraq’s efforts to keep any mention of al Qaeda top-secret have been exposed in post-war official Iraqi documents. Particularly, the high priority secrecy revealed in the 1998 documents recovered by Inigo Gilmore and Mitch Potter and the 1993 documents reported by 60 Minutes and the Washington Times. If this document was authored by an Iraqi official, it matches up with how other Iraqi paperwork regarding al Qaeda has been handled.

The author (of the recovered documents) reminds their agents to keep information relating to their mission “compartmentalized”, meaning it was kept to those on a need to know basis.
“15- It is forbidden to talk about your work or the nature of your mission with anybody who is not related to it” the document says.
Both Iraq and al Qaeda have a history of keeping important missions strictly compartmentalized. I have some further examples of this here. If this document did not refer to Iraqi representatives, it at least matched al Qaeda's preference for compartmentalization.

Another indicator that the “Arab” regime responsible for authoring the document is Iraq is the timeliness of the military training and visits to Afghanistan. This type of collaboration would match up quite well with portions of the 9-11 Commission’s report, revelations from al Qaeda and Baathist interrogations and documents, and accounts of Middle East experts.

Some of the noteworthy events pertaining to Iraqi involvement in Afghanistan during this time period (1998-1999) are as follows:

In March, 1998 - Iraqi government delegations went to Afghanistan after bin Laden’s public fatwa against the U.S., discussions between the two sides include mutual hatred of United States 9-11 Commission Final report
(This establishes a good possibility of an Iraqi presence in Afghanistan)

July, 1998 - Iraq representatives visited bin Laden and Taliban representatives in Afghanistan “In July, an Iraqi delegation traveled to Afghanistan to meet first with the Taliban and then with Bin Ladin” 9-11 Commission Final Report
(Further high ranking meetings tend to support the notion that something important taking place)

August, 1998 - al Qaeda members in custody have reported being part of a joint mission with Iraq Intelligence to target U.S. and British embassies for attacks during this time Stephen Hayes, Thomas Joscelyn. Weekly Standard. 7-18-05
(This indicates coordination, in at least limited examples, of anti-U.S. attacks)

October, 1998 – an Iraqi intelligence officer (likely Farouk Hijazi) assured Iraq support for Taliban, al Qaeda, Pakistani militant groups
"In Oct 98, an Iraqi intelligence official met with the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, Osama bin Ladin, and Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of Egypt's Jihad movement. In Dec, according to Al-Majllah, the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad held a series of meetings with "leaders of a number of Pakistani fundamentalist movements and elements from the Taleban, with the knowledge of Pakistani military intelligence. On 21 December a high-ranking Iraqi diplomat normally based in Turkey visited Taleban leader Mullah Omar's residence in Kandahar, then headed for Khowat where he met with bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri...[He] affirmed to his Afghan and Arab audience Iraq's willingness to provide financial, logistic, political and informational support for the Taleban and the Afghan Arabs." - Al-Majallah weekly newspaper in London, England (10 Jan 1999) Securitywatchtower citing Stephen Hayes “The Connection”
(This story sounds almost identical to Ray’s past two pieces, note that it was reported in 1999)

Late 1998 – Farouk Hijazi met bin Laden in Afghanistan, meeting likely was offer of sanctuary for bin Laden in Iraq Peter Eisler, USA Today, 12-02-01
(This meeting was widely reported at the time yet Hijazi has admitted to previous meetings and denied this one)

November, 1998 - Al Qaeda and Iraqi Intelligence officials met in Kabul to discuss suicide attacks to drive U.S. out of Middle East Sam Pender “Saddam’s Ties to Al Queda” citing 9-11 Commission Report, Chapter 2

December 1998 – Bin Laden/Farouk Hijazi meetings included agreement by both sides to unleash anti-American terror war Yossef Bodansky, "Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War On America", p.361, ABC NEWS clip, January 14, 1999

1999 - Faruok Hijazi’s meeting with al Qaeda leads to the set up for organized training of al Qaeda members in Afghanistan and Iraq, led by Unit 999. Yossef Bodansky, "Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War On America", p.361
(Unit 999 is reportedly the same unit involved in the attempted IIS car bomb attack on Bush Sr.)

January 27, 1999 - Al Qaeda said to be cooperating with Iraq’s elite Unit 999 during this time Scott Peterson, Christian Science Monitor, 4-2-02

September 1999 - Izzat al-Douri/Ayman al-Zawahiri meetings include discussions of terror camps and joint training ADNKRONOS International 5-23-05
(Is this to discuss ongoing training in Afghanistan? Future training in Iraq or Afghanistan? Iraq’s #1 “Most Wanted” man, Izzat al Douri would surely know the answers if captured alive)

November, 1999 - Iraq embassy in Pakistan said to be functioning as point of contact with al Qaeda Stephen Hayes, Weekly Standard, 11-24-2003

Iraq’s Pakistan embassy contact is later listed in Iraqi paper as Iraq’s contact point for bin Laden Stephen Hayes, Weekly Standard, 7-11-2003
(Multiple sources now indicate that the Pakistan/Afghanistan region was a place where meetings took place)

Late December 1999 – A Secret Meeting "Saddam Husayn and Osama Bin Ladin have sealed a pact. Faruq Hijazi, the former director of the Iraqi secret services and now the country's ambassador to Turkey, held a secret meeting with the extremist leader on 21 December Italian Newspaper Corriere della Sera (28 Dec 1999) via Securitywatchtower
(Unlike Iraq’s assistance to Hamas, Abu Nidal and other terrorist groups, the former regime viewed a possible relationship with al Qaeda as one that must be kept secret)

October, 2000 – an Iraqi intelligence operative, Salah Suleiman, was arrested near the Afghan border by Pakistani authorities while shuttling between Iraqi intelligence and Ayman al Zawahiri Janes Intelligence Report, 9-19-2001
(Pak/Afghanistan region continued to be a hub for communication)

Conclusions

The possibility of Iraqi military/intelligence training in Afghanistan (mentioned most recently in this new translated document), coupled with what else has been reported about Iraqi activity in Afghanistan in 1998-99, adds credibility to the comments of Ali Ibrahim al- Tikriti, a former General for Saddam Hussein and the Senate Intelligence Committee’s Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq who noted that hatred of the U.S. and Israel brought al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s regime together. The public’s understanding of how much cooperation between the former Iraqi regime and al Qaeda, and whether or not these documents refer to Iraq-al Qaeda cooperation will be better understood as more documents from both Iraq and Afghanistan are translated and analyzed (by Ray Robison and others). Pressure from legislators and other public figures will hopefully speed the release of these documents.

Bassem Mroue of the AP nicely summarized some of the recent revelations about the former regime noted in Iraq's new "Most Wanted" list. He quoted Iraqi officials as saying:

"Saddamists are the largest group of insurgents and they give protection and shelter to other terrorists," deputy parliament speaker Khalid al-Attiyah said. "They finance them and supply them with weapons. They are the most dangerous."

This account mirrors what Iraqi officials told reporters after the death of Zarqawi and analysis of documents in his possession.

"Saddamists and Baathists are responsible for acts of terrorism hitting the country," said Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, one of Iraq's top Shiite politicians. "They are the main problem. They are using the method of killing to achieve their goals. Some want to bring back the unjust rule that controlled Iraq. On top of those are the criminal Baathists."

Analysts at StrategyPage.com provided further details of the dangerous Baath/al Qaeda alliance in Iraq in their July 5th special.

In addition to C.S. Scott's impressive analysis of the new list at Securitywatchtower.com, the names below stuck out for various reasons.

18 - Maan Bashour, Lebanese Baathist. Has a long relationship with Saddam's regime. He recruits fighters in Lebanon to go to Iraq to support terrorist operations.
― When did Bashour begin recruiting fighters to go to Iraq? What terrorist groups is he affiliated with? What type of relationship did he have with Saddam’s regime? Is he still in contact with the Baathist element of the Iraqi insurgency?

19 - Isam Khudhir Abbas al-Dulaimi, $50,000 bounty. Former director in the intelligence agency, he supports the Muhammad Army insurgent group.
― The Muhammad Army insurgent group has coordinated attacks with al Qaeda in the past.

29. Abdul-Hadi al-Iraqi, “a top leader with al-Qaida in Iraq and the Mujahedeen Shura Council and originally comes from Nineveh province. He was a Major in Saddam Hussein's army but left to travel to Iraq to fight against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1990s. Newsweek had a feature on Abdul-Hadi, who is seen as a key liaison between Bin Laden and al Qaeda's leadership in Afghanistan, and the al Qaeda network formerly headed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq.” C.S. Scott, Securitywatchtower, 7-3-04
― It would be interesting to know how close al-Iraqi was with bin Laden during his time in Afghanistan and what types of contacts he maintained with Iraqi officials, including Saddam Hussein and his inner circle.