Over past few months a number of stories related to the former Iraqi regime's links to terrorism have further developed.

Recently, former top aide of Saddam Hussein, Izzat al Douri, was said to have renounced his alliance with al Qaeda. What isn't being asked is how can Al Douri, who once told TIME of cooperating with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, be "breaking" from al Qaeda if Baathists would not be willing to work with al Qaeda to begin with?

In a related story, former Iraqi PM (and former Baath party member) Iyad Allawi's connections to information about members of the former regime may have been reinforced when he was reportedly able to set up a meeting between representatives of Izzat al Douri and U.S. representatives. If Allawi truly has these sorts of contacts inside the ranks of the former regime it would be wise not to discount his knowledge (video and story here) regarding the former regime's links to al Qaeda, including possible meetings with al Qaeda #2 Ayman al-Zawahiri.

While reviewing the latest tape from Osama bin Laden Tom Joscelyn reminded his readers of the Associated Press's analysis of what bin Laden instructed his followers to do prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq:

Feb. 11, 2003: Bin Laden tells his followers to help Saddam Hussein fight Americans in an audiotape broadcast on Al-Jazeera. U.S. officials say they believe the tape to be authentic

Saddam Hussein's daughter has been targeted for arrest by Iraqi officials for her financial support for terrorist groups operating inside Iraq. Much of her funding is likely to be that of the former regime's.

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has an updated, and still partial, look at the reported prewar relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda. The report's author, Kenneth Katzman, actually addresses the extensive postwar cooperation between Saddam loyalists and al Qaeda but makes many of the same mistakes when analyzing possible relationships between the two sides by failing to analyze any of the actual documents from the former regime which have been found in Iraq or to look at the interrogation logs of any of the Ba'athists who have been caught working with and for al Qaeda. Specifically, Katzman did not ask how and when Ba'athists put aside those reported "irreconcilable differences" they had with al Qaeda.

The U.S. government's wanted profile for Abdul Rahman Yasin, though the information is longer available, temporarily listed Yasin as having last been seen in the Arabian Peninsula and also as a member of al Qaeda. Though Yasin's links to the 93' World Trade Center attack have been known for some time his listing as a member of al Qaeda by the U.S. government may have been the first time. Postwar intelligence, including recovered documents, indicate that Yasin was harbored and funded by the former regime.

Continued Baathist - al Qaeda cooperation in Iraq

In the Arab Jabour of Iraq an Egyptian, still unnamed, who came to Iraq in the 80's and later became a "former high ranking official of the Ba'ath party during Saddam Hussein's reign" was arrested. Sometime after coming to Iraq he "joined al-Qaeda fighters" and led a VBIED cell which had been targeting coaltion forces.

In a story passed along to this site by Dr. Laurie Mylroie, the leader of a wanted al Qaeda in Iraq cell with links to the former regime was detained on September 3. His cell, in the Old Za'ab Village, is believed to include members of "the former Ba’ath Party, 1920th Revolutionary Brigade, Islamic State of Iraq, New Ba’ath Party and El-Huk Brigade members. Additionally, his group is suspected of orchestrating attacks in Ninewa, Salah ah Din
and At' Tamim provinces...Scouts were able to detain the leader’s deputy, a wanted member of the former Ba’ath Party. In addition, the village is believed to be a safe haven and planning node for synchronization of al Qaeda in Iraq forces."

The leader of al Qaeda in Tikrit (Tikrit being Saddam Hussein's birthplace and former stronghold), Salam Mulla Mustafa Shneidkh was caught in mid-2007 with four of his aids. Wanted members of al Qaeda continue to be captured in Tikrit and and in cooperation with members of the former regime throughout the Sunni Triangle.

In a relatively unnoticed event, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's followers, the Ba'ath party and Ansar al-Sunnah released a joint statement protesting the state of affairs in Iraq sometime after the Sharm al-Shaykh conference a few years back. The letter was written by the Ba'ath party and said the groups would double their attacks on coalition targets.

Amy Proctor has posted a video on her site of a 2005 televised confession by Ramzi Hashem Abed that mentions a number of interesting points including an al Qaeda affiliate's presence in Saddam Hussein-era Iraq as well as post-invasion cooperation between members of Hussein's regime and the al Qaeda linked group whom Abed refers to as "bin Laden's group."

In the video the native Iraqi mentions a camp in Northern Iraq that may be the same one Joseph Shahda wrote about on this site and also indicates that another terror camp was possibly used for Hussein-era training in Fallujah.

Investigator: What organization do you belong to?

Abed: Ansar Al-Islam.

Investigator: What organization is this?

Abed: It is Bin-Laden’s group.

ON BIN LADEN’S AL-QAEDA TRAINING CAMPS IN FALLUJAH UNDER SADDAM:
Abed: Our Ansar Al-Islam military camps were in Halabja.

Investigator: This was in the days of the previous regime?

Abed: Yes.

Investigator: And now?

Abed: Now, there is nothing. They were all scattered. The training area was in Falluja.

It is not clear when exactly Abed is saying the training took place in Fallujah but this is the city where Baathist/Wahhabist cooperation took place post invasion and a city in which, according to Ray Robison, Wahhabism may have been not only tolerated but assited by the former regime.

As Thomas Joscelyn correctly noted this man's words should not be accepted uncritically but there is other evidence to support this claim that Joscelyn summarizes:

the 9/11 Commission noted that there were "indications" that Saddam's regime "tolerated and may even have helped" Ansar al Islam - the group Abed admitted belonging to -set up shop in Saddam's Iraq. The Commission decided not to get into the details of what these "indications" were, but clearly the CIA was piecing together these threads of evidence prior to the U.S.-led invasion. The 9/11 Commission also noted that bin Laden "is said to have asked for space to establish training camps" as early as 1994 or 1995. The Commission said "there is no evidence that Iraq responded to this request." But, that isn't true - at least it isn't now true anyway.

Eventually this story will be sorted out as more detainees (al Qaeda, Ansar al Islam and Saddam Hussein officials) interrogation logs are made public and their accounts analyzed and compared with the those documents that have been part of the limited release of material found both in these camps and in official offices of the former regime.