My piece on the numerous detainees/defectors now in custody who have said al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's regime cooperated, at least in some capacity, is now up at FrontPage magazine.

Dan Darling has brought attention to some details from a recent article in the Algerian publication L'Expression regarding Algerian jihadist activity in pre-invasion Iraq. (This story was also reported by Stephen Hayes in a January 2006 Weekly Standard column titled "Saddam's Terror Training Camps". Revelations from the past six months have given additional support to Hayes' story.)

The article titled "Jihadist Algerians in Iraq: The 'Syrian Networks'" by Faycal Oukac cites Egyptian specialist Dia Rachwane on how and when many Algerian jihadis made their way into the country.

The Arab fighters' entry into Iraq happened before the American invasion, and several hundred fighters were on the ground before the fall of Saddam's regime, such as, for example, the Ansar el-Islam group to which Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi belonged before joining Al-Qa'ida. The fighters with the Arab legions arrived

The training of foreign suicide bombers, by the former regime, is also the topic of an official Iraqi government document (ISGP-2003-00028868) recovered post-invasion. The document, translated by Joseph Shahda, discusses the training of "Estishehadeyeen", which Shahda translated as meaning “Suicide Martyrs.” The memo, according to Shahda, also reveals that the suicide bombers were foreign and not Iraqi because "The Iraqi Feedaeyeens are known as “Feedaeyeen Saddam” so not to confuse between the two groups." The training instructions for the "Estishehadeyeen" include "how to become suicide bombers by using their own bodies, or suicide bombers using cars and motorcycles full of explosive."

It is also worth noting that Algerian jihadis were even among the fighters that reporters witnessed in a Baghdad training camp before the invasion, just as Saddam Hussein and his top lieutenants had claimed.

Okac's next words further support the claim that many of the Algerian and other foreign fighters came at the behest of the former regime (and al Qaeda leadership):

The fighters with the Arab legions arrived, some following instructions from the Al-Qa'ida leadership, some on their own initiative......As Ali Moussa Mahmud, the communications officer with the Iraqi embassy, emphasized at the time, 'these young people are only giving evidence of their support for the mother of Arab-Muslim civilization'....Tariq Aziz, one of the Iraqi regime's heavyweights, said that "the suicide attacks are a response to this rain of missiles." More than 5,000 foreign volunteers for the fight against "the American aggression" were already in Iraq. Others continued to arrive. The support from these activists was not symbolic. Whether fighters or providing logistical support, they opposed the American hegemony, thus boosting national and religious feelings.....'This war is an act of aggression against all Muslims,' Naji Sabri, the Iraqi foreign affairs minister, exclaimed. Saddam said a prayer, lifted both hands to ask for Allah's help, and added something to the Iraqi flag, which would be emblazoned with an Allah Akbar, which went around the world, and ended up convincing young jihadists to follow Saddam...

Which members of al Qaeda's leadership were instructing foreign fighters and jihadists to enter Iraq before March 2003 is an interesting question. Possibly Saif al Adel, Zarqawi or new al Qaeda in Iraq chief Abu Ayyub al-Masri.

Translated documents of the former regime, foreign fighters captured on the battlefield alongside Iraqi forces and the testimony of Middle East sources all indicate that Saddam Hussein and a number of his top officials invoked the call for a holy war and called on (and recruited and trained) jihadist fighters from throughout the Arab to fight against the U.S. pre-invasion.

These prewar requests were made and answered by a large number of Algerians (to say nothing of who was recruited from other countries) who coupled with members of his own regime to fight a 3+ year guerilla war against U.S. and coalition troops.

Radio Polonia is reporting reporting that Polish Intelligence agents have captured an Iraqi terrorist wanted for a number of terrorist attacks, including the fatal attack on a Polish public televsion war correspondant and his assistant.

The background of that wanted terrorist, Salas Khabbas, is what is most interesting.

Polish reports suggest that Khabbas, who has "a long record of killings and kidnappings" and is "a former member of the Baath party and closely linked with al-Qaeda, specialized in attacking convoys and kidnapping."

Khabbas may reveal his exact role in the former regime to his captors as well as how and when he became "closely linked" with al-Qaeda. In the meantime, his name has been added to the ever-growing list of former regime officials caught fighting as al Qaeda agents in Iraq.

Sachin Parashar, of The Times of India, is reporting that the American embassy in India is on heightened alert amid reports of an impending terror attack.

The attack is reportedly scheduled to take place before July 30 by a 20-man cell. The cell is described as an "Iranian terror group" made up of Iranian, Afghan and Kashmiri nationals, armed with sophisticated weaponry.

What is noteworthy about this report is not only that the unnamed terror group is said to have previously "backed" Saddam Hussein but that the warning for the attack was gathered, at least in part, from captured members of al Qaeda in Pakistan.

It is possible that the "Iranian group" in question is the formerly Iraq-based terror group MKO, though their previous attacks have primarily been directed at the post-Shah regime of Iran.

Therefore, the members, goals and background of the Iranian group in question, as well as the nature of their "backing" of Saddam Hussein are interesting questions that deserve answers. The arrest and capture of this terror cell, by Indian and/or American forces, would be a necessary step in answering those questions.

Regarding al Qaeda, the devastating simultaneous embassy attacks in Africa in 1998 and the attack on the U.S. consulate in Jeddah in 2004 exemplify their extensive background in such attacks, and thus the intelligence gained from al Qaeda detainees may indicate that the attacks are, at least partially, al Qaeda sponsored. Groups affiliated with al Qaeda in the Kashmir region include Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad , meaning that al Qaeda's knowledge of an impending attack is not unlikely.

My piece on Saddam Hussein's possible links to Islamic terrorists in the Kashmir region, "Indian Islamist terror group had ties to Saddam", is now up at Insight magazine's website.

Thanks to Laurie Mylroie and others who passed along relevant information for the story.

With the upcoming Senate Intelligence report due shortly, perhaps the question of where and how Ansar al Islam received CBW know-how (which included ricin, botulinum and possibly cyanide) and equipment will finally be answered.

Initial reports from American media outlets mentioned the findings of the Ansar al Islam camps in Northern Iraq included directions on making high grade explosives and Iraqi military grade TNT in addition to the CBW starter kit. As mentioned by both the 9-11 Commission and Senate Intelligence Committee, the group's support from Saddam Hussein's regime included various types of weaponry with the likely intention being the group's targeting the anti-regime Kurds in the region.

Answers to what U.S. special forces and investigators found at the camps (regarding CBW) weren't fully answered in Western media outlets, likely due to the sensitive nature of findings.
In Germany's media, one journalist, said to have excellent contacts within German Intelligence, did reveal some of the findings. Over 3 years ago, Bruno Schirra of the German weekly Hamburg Die Zeit, (who's article was recently made available to Regime of Terror by someone with access to foreign media outlets) revealed that Baghdad's contributions to Ansar al Islam were not limited to conventional weapons.

Schirra reported that hundreds of bottles of acetone, labelled as coming from Baghdad; weapons, including anti-aircraft missiles (both of which also reportedly came from Baghdad); 30 kg of potassium cyanide, stored in hermetically sealed barrels; chemical measuring instruments; lab equipment; gas masks and C4 loaded suicide vests were among the items recovered at the camp. Also recovered was "a handbook, which, on more than 50 pages, contains exact instructions for building chemical bombs and grenades."

Schirra concludes "it is clear that essential parts of the laboratory substances came from Baghdad." Likely referring to the Ansar al Islam laboratory suspected as the source of attempted CBW attacks in the UK and elsewhere.

The idea that Baghdad's contributions to al Qaeda and it's affiliates included unconventional training was stated by Mansoor Ijaz a few weeks before U.S. forces entered Iraq. In his National Review article "Hand in Glove", Ijaz, calling on his experience and knowledge of Middle Eastern affairs, asserted that Iraq has long provided members of al Qaeda (and its affiliates) with manuals and recipes for CBW and other poisons (as well as access to the scientists who know how to use and acquire ingredients).

Since former CIA director George Tenet first told the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2003 that intelligence reports indicated that Iraq had provided al Qaeda with training in poisons and gases, multiple fighters, who have been captured on the battlefield in Iraq and Afghanistan, have confirmed this cooperation.

Charles Duelfer also saw evidence of Iraqi involvement in al Qaeda's CBW quest in Afghanistan, saying "There's a lot of (intelligence) collection going on in those caves and mountains... "We're going to hear about more ties between al-Qaeda and Iraq, particularly when it comes to al-Qaeda's efforts to get chemical and biological weapons."

Understandably, the intelligence surrounding al Qaeda's CBW programs was once highly sensitive (and quite justifiably in the classified realm), but now, with Afghanistan having been liberated nearly 5 years ago, and Iraq 3 years ago, the need to classify the CIA and FBI reports on the origins of al Qaeda/Ansar al Islam's poison and CBW capabilities would seem to be greatly diminished.

The upcoming Senate Intelligence report, with a mandate including an examination Baghdad's prewar links to terrorists, would seem to be an appropriate time to address these issues.

Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi, listed by Iraqi officials as a native of Mosul, was recently named #29 on Iraq's "Most Wanted" list.

According told NEWSWEEK magazine's intelligence sources (and at least one of the journalists involved in the story was detained by Pakistani officials) and other reports, al-Iraqi is one of Osama bin Laden's top global deputies (challenging the notion that Iraqis have not held prominent positions in al-Qaeda), personally chosen by bin Laden to monitor al-Qaeda operations in Iraq. His duties have connected him to numerous attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan and found him shuttling information between al-Qaeda's branch in Iraq and remaining leadership in the Afghanistan/Pakistan borderland.

What is also noteworthy is al-Iraqi's background in Saddam Hussein's Army (pointed out to this site by Laurie Mylroie). During his military service over a decade ago, al-Iraqi worked his way up to the rank of Major before moving to Afghanistan to fight "jihad" against the occupying Soviet Union. This is not to assert that al-Iraqi maintained contact with Iraqi officials over the past decade (though many other Intelligence and Military officers from Saddam Hussein's regime, who were later found to be assisting al Qaeda, reportedly did) but his knowledge of the country and contacts within Iraq certainly played a role in al-Iraqi being Osama bin Laden's personal choice to monitor al Qaeda's operations in Iraq. al-Iraqi's military background likely was of great use in the terrorist training camp(s) he commanded in Afghanistan. Those camps were destroyed by U.S. forces in late 2001 around the same time that al-Iraqi's funds were beingfrozen by the United Nations.

The former Iraqi Major's network may now stretch into Europe, where captured al-Qaeda affiliates have admitted meeting with al-Iraqi and other top al-Qaeda leaders. According to Pakistani officials, Zeeshan Siddique, arrested for preparing terrorist attacks (suicide bombing) and membership to al-Qaeda, told his interrogators that Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi was among the remaining al-Qaeda leadership still provoking attacks with whom he had met while traveling the Afghanistan/Pakistan borderland.

Much is being disputed about the contents and conclusions asserted within the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report attempting to compare, in three major sections, prewar Iraq intelligence estimates with postwar Iraq findings regarding ‘Iraq’s WMD Capabilities,’ ‘Iraqi Links to al-Qaeda’ and ‘Regime Intent.’ While it is being currently touted in media reports with the air of a comprehensive and definitive assessment, it is decidedly neither. This is the introduction of a collaborative series of analytical reviews of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee report titled, "Postwar Findings About Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism And How They Compare With Prewar Assessments."

By the report’s own acknowledgement, there has yet to be produced a "'fully researched, coordinated and approved position' on the postwar reporting on the former regime's links to al-Qa'ida" by the Intelligence Community with which to compare to prewar assessments. Furthermore, especially with regard to WMD capabilities and ‘Regime Intent,’ the incredibly thorough Iraqi Perspectives Project postwar study produced by United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, was not even considered with other postwar assessments.

Rather than cite such reports for its postwar input, the SSIC preferred to quote testimony in several instances from both Saddam Hussein and his Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz (among others). Both are in custody and on trial. As Tom Joscelyn rightly points out, these men--“all of whom have an obvious incentive to lie--are cited or quoted without caveats of any sort.”

Nor, apparently, did the Committee consider the prewar intelligence cited by Stephen Hayes in November, 2003. Hayes exposes in the referenced article many connections, not the least of which were multiple sources corroborating multiple Iraqi meetings with bin-Laden in Afghanistan and Pakistan by Iraqis – including the deputy director of the Iraqi Intelligence Services. Included in an October 2003 memo from Undersecretary of Defense for Policy to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee was a clarifying note saying, “Reporting entries #4, #11, #15, #16, #17, and #18, from different sources, corroborate each other and provide confirmation of meetings between al Qaeda operatives and Iraqi intelligence in Afghanistan and Pakistan.”

This is seemingly dismissed and not included as noteworthy prewar intelligence for consideration, just as the Iraqi Perspectives Project was dismissed from consideration for postwar findings.

While early in the SSIC report it mentions the attempt to create an intelligence "baseline," the conclusions are written in a language that purports them as definitive. In fact, Conclusion 9 on page 112 reads, “While document exploitation continues, additional reviews of documents recovered in Iraq are unlikely to provide information that would contradict the Committee’s findings or conclusions.”

This is an ill advisedly bold statement, and notes Michael Tanji, who has been involved in the Iraqi document exploitation process, "[S]aying that you have a strong grasp on what was and wasn’t going on in Iraq based on an “initial review” is akin to saying that you don’t need to read the bible because you’ve memorized the ten commandments."

This hardly scratches the surface of the report’s inadequate considerations, inconsistencies and, therefore, erroneous conclusions. There are a great many aspects of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report that must be swiftly addressed, in particular the data used and conclusions asserted regarding the connections between Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and al-Qaeda.

It is imperative that the American public be presented with a more complete picture than the seemingly selective data points utilized by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report.

To this end, ThreatsWatch and Regime of Terror are working together in order to provide an extensive analysis to the general public in a more easily digested format. This analysis will be produced and published as a series of focused examinations of the conclusions tendered by the Senate Select Intelligence Committee’s report as it pertains to the connections between Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and al-Qaeda terrorists.

Newly elected Pennsylvania Congressman, Democrat Chris Carney, a former Senior Terrorism and Intelligence Advisor at the Pentagon, has recently been quoted in a number of publications discussing his knowledge of and role in prewar Iraq intelligence, particularly on the issue Saddam Hussein’s links to al Qaeda. His views on the subject are a stark contrast to many in his party, particularly Senator Carl Levin, who has long expressed his belief that any link between Saddam Hussein's regime and al Qaeda was a manufacture of the Bush administration. Carney's comments and experience on the issue may even put him in the cross-hairs of Sen. Levin's reported investigation into the matter in the coming months. What did Congressman Carney say? What does he know?

Carney said that he came to his conclusion about Saddam’s links to al Qaeda being a 2.5 on a 10 scale while “looking at terrorist links between Al Qaeda and state sponsors of terrorism, including Iraq,” He went on, “Saddam had links to every terrorist group in the region. I still think there were links to Al Qaeda.”

Having links to “every terrorist group in the region” sounds similar to the prognosis made by the U.S. State Department in 2002 about Iraq's involvement in terrorism.

“It was a relationship of keeping your friends close and your enemies closer,” he added. “Saddam was a savvy guy, and I think he wanted to make sure that if Al Qaeda someday became a force, that he wanted to keep his options open. I thought that there was a relationship. Whether it was strong enough to go to war, that’s the president’s decision.”

In the summer and fall of 2002, Mr. Carney was at the center of the storm, briefing George J. Tenet, then the director of central intelligence, and Stephen J. Hadley, then the deputy national security adviser, on the Feith unit’s assessment of any links between Iraq and Al Qaeda. At the time, the unit was creating controversy within the government for arguing that there was significant evidence of ties between Iraq and Al Qaeda.

Risen's piece does not illuminate who in the government was opposed to Mr. Carney's observations or why, though it was likely the CIA.

Greg Miller of the L.A. Times quoted Carney on why he thought there were different conclusions amongst those in the intelligence community, including the CIA.

“Carney and another DIA analyst, Christina Shelton, spent months poring over thousands of raw intelligence reports. They quickly concluded that the CIA, which had been skeptical of any serious relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda, was getting it wrong. "I found it kind of curious the way they were so equivocal in the analysis," Carney said of the CIA reports. "It was frustrating to me and others with all the caveating that was going on."

But according to the recent Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) investigation Saddam Hussein did not approve of al Qaeda’s ideology and ordered members of his regime not even to meet with al Qaeda.

Does Congressman Carney know of additional (and still classified) intelligence that even the SSCI has yet to see that counters Saddam Hussein's assurances that members of his regime were ordered not to meet with al Qaeda?

Is there a specific meeting, photo, document, detainee or intercepted transmission that Congressman Carney is privy to that links al Qaeda not only to Saddam Hussein's regime but all the way up to Hussein himself in some way?

If additional intelligence is still classified that links Saddam Hussein to al Qaeda (and the intelligence won't compromise ongoing missions) then that intelligence being made available to elected officials and the public is long overdue and should have been turned over the SSCI for their investigation into the issue.

Perhaps it is this still-classified intelligence, yet to see the eyes of members of the Senate Intelligence Committee and many members of the intelligence community, that is the explanation behind those from members of both political parties who continue to challenge the "conventional wisdom" on the subject.

What does Congressman Carney know that his Congressional colleagues don't know about Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda and when will this information be allowed to enter the public debate?

Saddam Hussein , Iraq, Chris Carney, al Qaeda

TIME magazine recently posted an interview with native Iraqi Abu Mohammed reflecting on a number of things related to Saddam Hussein's death including the effect that Hussein and his Baath regime had on the country of Iraq and Hussein's followers joining up with Abu Musab al Zarqawi after Hussein had been captured. (A confession also made in TIME magazine earlier this year by Hussein's former right-hand man Izzat al Douri.)

Even the remnants of his (Hussein's) old regime, which had morphed into the Sunni insurgency, seemed to lose their fervor for Saddam (after his capture). Some Ba'athist groups kept up the charade that they were fighting to restore the dictator to his palace, but others quickly stopped referring to him at all and instead recast themselves as "the nationalist resistance" or as "mujahedin," or holy warriors. Many threw in their lot with the new ogre on the scene, Al-Qaeda's Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

The secular Baath party, long been said to be completely incompatible with extremist groups such as al Qaeda, has repeatedly been pinpointed as al Qaeda's main ally in post-invasion Iraq, even to the point of following al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi after Saddam Hussein had been captured.

It's worth asking when and how these networks and relationships began, though it's a question rarely asked in mainstream media circles.

Hamza went on to confirm his knowledge of the former Baathists extensive hand in the post-invasion violence and terror.

One afternoon last October, I watched the televised Saddam trial in the company of Abu Hamza, a field commander of Jaish al-Islami. Iraq's largest insurgent group, Jaish al-Islami is made up mainly of Ba'athists and soldiers from Saddam's army. Abu Hamza had been an officer in Saddam's elite Republican Guard; in previous meetings, he had spoken reverentially about the dictator, describing him as a man who exuded power and gravitas.

Jaish al-Islami, aka the Islamic Army of Iraq, is linked to al Qaeda in Iraq in the world of anti-coalition forces operating inside Iraq and as the "largest insurgent group" has obviously done quite a bit to prevent Iraq's elected government from stabilizing the country.

Saddam Hussein , Iraq, al Qaeda

A former Defense and Finance Minister of post-invasion Iraq, Ali A. Allawi has completed and just released a book titled "The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace" that talks about the inner workings of many things that took place in post-invasion Iraqi government.

Amir Taheri's review of the book for Asharq al Alawsat reveals that Allawi's points to some of the roots of today's violence in Iraq going back over a decade to when Saddam Hussein used violent groups for his own domestic purposes.

One of the most interesting revelations in this book is Allawi's account of the emergence of Arab Sunni radicalism in Iraq. He (Allawi) shows that the first Jihadi groups were patronized by Saddam to counter-balance Shi'ite influence from Iran. Saddam may not have entered into a formal alliance with Al Qaeda. However, as Allawi shows, he was in league with Al Qaeda-style Jihadis, such as Jund al-Islam (Army of Islam) and Ansar al-Islam (Victors of Islam), for a decade before he was toppled.

Kurdish officials have also testified that Ansar al Islam was also employed by Hussein's regime to counter their leadership.

Allawi's book is now available for order through Amazon.com and, based on the reviews, the book appears to be a fascinating read.

For a regime long said to be sharply opposed to radical Islamic groups the secular Baath Party that formerly ruled Iraq has seen a conspicuously large number of its members caught in close collaboration with al Qaeda and other Islamic groups in post-invasion Iraq.

A recent arrest in Mosul identified a former Saddam Fedayeen leader as an insurgent leader responsible for al Qaeda/foreign fighter camps in Syria.

On March 23, the Tactical Report, an online Middle East intelligence service, reported that a former Saddam Hussein officer was appointed as an al Qaeda leader to set up attacks on Iraqi oil sites.

In addition to these "new converts" a number of older stories on the same topic were passed along to www.regimeofterror.com.

One story, from the Arabic newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat translated by a reader at Powerlineblog notes that one of the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's top men, Omar Hadid, was a former personal body guard of Saddam Hussein and had trained with al Qaeda in Afghanistan before fighting against coalition forces in Fallujah and elsewhere. Hadid, according to an al Qaeda biography after his death, also had a relative who was an official for Iraq's Intelligence Services and worked with Hadid on postwar operations. It should also be noted that, according to Knight-Ridder news services, Hadid's background included outright conflicts with Saddam Hussein's regime though he testified to the country's move away from secular restraints after the first Gulf War.

As previously detailed in a piece at The American Thinker by Ray Robison, the fighting in Fallujah a number of years back also saw the teaming up of many members of Saddam Hussein's former Republican Guard and foreign and domestic jihadist fighters.

Reportedly there were "scores of men" like Abu Mustafa (who) was one former military officer who told TIME that he spent his time in jail (post-invasion) "studying Salafi Islam and receiving lessons in jihad from bearded Iraqis and detainees who came from places like Syria and Saudi Arabia" before joining the jihadist fighters in Iraq.

Abu Ali was “Among those who have thrown their support behind the jihad is insurgent leader Abu Ali. A ballistic-missile specialist in Saddam's Fedayeen militia, he fought U.S. troops during the invasion and has served as a resistance commander ever since, organizing rocket attacks on the green zone, the headquarters of the U.S. administration in Baghdad. When interviewed by TIME last fall, he spoke of a vain hope that Saddam would return and re-establish a Baathist regime.” How Ali pictured a "secular" leader tolerating the type of violent Islamic extremism that Ali and others had helped spread in Iraq is quite a paradox.

One of the many anti coalition groups fighting in Iraq, called "Battalions of Islamic Holy War",
whose leaders also met with TIME magazine, was "founded by frontline officers from Saddam's intelligence services and the Republican Guard who once shunned terrorist attacks that killed innocent Iraqis" later represented a "significant Iraqi wing of al-Zarqawi's network." The Senate Intelligence Committee's report in 2004 revealed some intelligence that predicted these sorts of relationships.

These additions add to an already sizeable list of ex-Baathists/Saddam loyalists who sided with Islamic/jihadist fighters and al Qaeda in Iraq. While it is certainly possible that many of these religious conversions and new relationships were initiated post-invasion, drawn together by the common enemy of U.S. led forces in Iraq, it is unlikely that the countless (likely hundreds) remnants of Hussein's secular regime did not have at least some kind of a foundation for a relationship with these groups prior to March 2003. The type of trust and confidence necessary to give assets including money, weapons, arms, safehouses and training and reciprocal placement of Baathists into al Qaeda leadership positions only leads an outside observer to conclude that the two sides shared common grievances, common goals and common beliefs.

It has been 4 years since Operation Iraqi Freedom began and many of these relations that have been discovered post-invasion give cause for re-thinking prewar assumptions that secular Baathists wouldn't cooperate with Islamic militant/terrorist groups, just as some in the government had predicted as being possible prior to invasion, contrasting the conventional wisdom of then and now.

Abu Hafs Al-Tikriti threatens France on behalf of Abu Hafs Al-Masri Brigades (النسخه
العربية من قصة عن صلات محتملة بين حسين القاعده هنا

Within days of the French election results being announced a self-described al Qaeda cell in Europe, Abu Hafs Al-Masri Brigades, warned France of a “bloody jihad attack” in response to their electoral decision. The threat, posted on Islamist websites and translated by MEMRI, was signed by "Abu Hafs Al-Tikriti, The Abu Hafs Al-Masri Brigades, European Division."

The Abu Hafs Al-Masri Brigades, who al Qaeda #2 Ayman al-Zawahiri has claimed responsibility for, has a history of threats and claimed attacks in multiple European countries, including claiming responsibility for terrorist attacks in London in 2005 and Madrid in 2004. The group is named in honor of Mohammed Atef, the former al Qaeda military commander who has been named in intelligence reports cited in George Tenet’s book "At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA" as an al Qaeda leader who sought out closer links with Saddam Hussein’s regime, including weapons training.

Those familiar with leaders of the former Iraqi regime of Iraq likely recognize Abu Hafs Al-Tikriti’s surname. Al-Tikriti is said to mean "from Tikrit" and is well known as being Saddam Hussein's hometown. Al-Tikriti is also the name attached to many prominent leaders of Saddam Hussein’s former regime, picked for their loyalty. Al-Tikriti’s were prominent in many of Hussein’s most trusted positions and many of the original members of "Iraq's 55 Most Wanted". Al Tikriti’s filled positions including Hussein's personal secretary, leaders of his trusted Fedayeen Saddam, Mukhabarat (IIS) leadership, Republican Guard leadership as well as WMD specialists and military leaders.

It’s possible the Al-Tikriti linked to the recent threat was not a member of the Hussein regime. It is possible that if he were a member of the former Iraqi regime that he did not become linked to the European al Qaeda affiliate until post-invasion. It’s also possible that Al-Tikriti made up the name to disguise the author’s true identity (as the Middle East Media Research Institute’s Dr. Nimrod Raphaeli told this site often happens) but the long list of Hussein loyalists who have been caught in cooperation with al Qaeda and the common enemies of both Hussein loyalists and al Qaeda indicates a possibility that Hussein loyalist/al Qaeda cooperation isn’t limited to Iraq, where Iraqi officials have blamed years of postwar violence on Baathist/al Qaeda cooperation.

Update: Professor of Middle East History at Haifa University and author/expert on Iraq/Saddam Hussein, Amitzia Baram, stated that "the guy is not necessarily a member of Saddam's tribe (Albu Nasser) but, more certainly, he is from the town of Tikrit - Saddam's birthplace where other tribes, too, flourish. But he is an ex-Ba'thi very likely" when contacted by this site for comment on the possible background of Abu Hafs Al-Tikriti.

Update II: In a possibly related story two senior leaders of al Qaeda were reported captured in Tikrit, Iraq on June 23.

Saddam Hussein , Iraq, al Qaeda, Abu Hafs Al-Masri, Terrorism

Examining Saddam Hussein's last words
(دراسة صدام حسين الكلمات الاخيرة

In the months and weeks before his death Saddam Hussein (Uruknet photo on left) produced a number of communications to the world beyond his cell through speeches, letters and interviews. Some of these communications have been made public and reveal additional insights into the former Iraqi leader's personal beliefs and motives, particularly Hussein's views on jihad and the use of terrorism.

In his July 7, 2006 letter to the American people, Hussein (via Uruknet) referred to the insurgency in Iraq as "heroic Mujahideen, in glorious, virtuous, militant, jihadist Iraq. So God bless the heroic people of Iraq and God bless the jihad and Mujahideen."

The invocations of Islam and calls for a jihad against his foes were not new for Hussein. The calls for a "jihad" against the U.S. and its allies began at least as early as 1990 during the run up to the first Gulf War when Hussein declared a holy war against the U.S. and Israel, 1993 through his right hand man at Iraq's "Popular Islamic Conference" in Baghdad, in 1998 after U.S. air strikes on Iraq , in 2000 while speaking about the USS Cole bombing and in the months before the March 2003 invasion the calls were repeated. After coalition forces entered Iraq he again invoked the call for jihad at least twice before he was captured.

In a March 2006 interview held on Al-Fayhaa TV (found by "The Bullwinkle Blog" and translated by MEMRI) Hussein claimed responsibility for unspecified terrorist attacks.

I know that people who listen to me might think that Saddam Hussein has become apathetic in prison and stopped supporting terrorism. No. I’m not ashamed to tell you that Iraq, without Saddam Hussein, isn’t worth two bits. Therefore, it will make me happy if Iraq turns into dust.

Though this may have been tough talk from a man facing his own mortality or simply talk of using violence against those from both inside and outside his former ruling Baath Party who had crossed him during his time in prison it contrasts sharply with Hussein's previous denials of links to terrorism and similar comments made by Hussein's former mouthpiece Tariq Aziz.

Further critical analysis of Hussein's speeches (other speeches found here), analysis of the upcoming "tell all" book from Hussein's former lawyer, deciphering of public and private letters, interviews (as well as the eventual declassification of interrogation logs) will undoubtedly provide a means for deeper understanding of Hussein's stated desires and impressions regarding the West, Islam/Islamists, jihad and terrorism. These reports, combined with the previous findings of the Duelfer Report, the Iraqi Perspectives Project and CIA/DIA/FBI reports (which have been partially released through the Senate Intelligence Committee's look at the subject), are necessary for a full and comprehensive view into the world according to Saddam Hussein and thus any definitive pronouncements on Hussein's real motives should be withheld until such an effort can be made.

In a recent Washington Post Op-Ed former DIA analyst Christina Shelton discussed her intelligence work analyzing links between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's Iraq and countered some of the conventional wisdom on the subject while taking issue with the way her background and work were depicted in former CIA director George Tenet's recent book "At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA."

I said the covert nature of the relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda made it difficult to know its full extent; al-Qaeda's security precautions and Iraq's need to cloak its activities with terrorist networks precluded a full appreciation of their relationship.

Cooperation or meetings between the two sides would likely be something which would necessitate extreme secrecy and the information of such meetings/cooperation would likely be compartmentalized on a "need to know" basis if/when such meetings took.

Shelton referred to a 2002 letter from Tenet to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (available here)
that discussed the training, meetings and safehaven that were cited as details of the links between Saddam Hussein's Iraq and al Qaeda and indicated that this information (including a decade of high ranking contacts between the two) coupled with the information that was made public in Tenet's book (high ranking al Qaeda/Egyptian Islamic Jihad members moving to Baghdad prior to invasion) make a pretty compelling case for the argument that there was enough cause for concern about Iraq's links to al Qaeda (which Tenet also said in his book).

A more complete understanding of Iraq's relationship with al-Qaeda will emerge when historians can exploit the numerous seized documents free from the politics of the Iraq war.

More on this story is available at Thomas Joscelyn's site (who forwarded this site the Shelton Op-Ed), Michael Tanji's new site, Ed Morrissey's site, The Raw Story and at Powerlineblog.

An interview published in Saturday's Washington Post, with a member of the Iraq insurgency, reveals another example of the deadly postwar cooperation between members of Saddam Hussein's former ruling party and al Qaeda in Iraq.

In the piece, written by Joshua Hartlow, the insurgent identifies himself as "Abu Sarhan" and revealed that he "had been an officer in the Fedayeen (pictured right via Answers.com), the black-clad paramilitary force of the ousted government of Saddam Hussein."

"Sarhan" told his interviewers that he had risen to the level of "'general coordinator' between al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Omar Brigade, an insurgent group founded in July 2005 by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi." When and how "Sarhan" joined al Qaeda was not mentioned in the story.

The Omar Brigade is a group set up by Abu Musab al Zarqawi, before his death, to counter Shi'ites, particularly the Badr Brigade, an enemy of both al Qaeda in Iraq and Baathists.

As both the New York Times' John Burns and Strategy Page analysts have recently written the destination of choice for many al Qaeda members fleeing the U.S. surge in Iraq is areas like Ramadi, Baghdad and Baqouba where Saddam Hussein loyalists continue to still have some sway (though there are also Baathist linked groups who are confronting al Qaeda). The exact origins of this pattern of cooperation between some elements of Saddam Hussein's military/security/intelligence and al Qaeda is unknown but according to at least one former intelligence agent it goes back to at least 2001.

The size and role of al Qaeda and Baathist elements within the Iraq insurgency is also being discussed at Herschel Smith's site, Bill Roggio's site, Juan Cole's site and the Small War's Journal blog.

by Joseph Shahda

In April of 2007 the media wing for al Qaeda in Iraq and the Islamic State in Iraq, Al Furqan, released a video documentary about their Kurdistan Units in Northern Iraq. The video (click images to view) includes training and documents an attack on a Kurdish militia vehicle and is titled "Al Awda Ila Al Jibal" or "The Return To The Mountains."

According to the jihadist websites (World News Network) and forums who posted copies of the video the footage was shot somewhere between 2002 and early 2003, when al Qaeda was moving fighters to Iraq under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

Because of the totalitarian nature of Saddam Hussein's regime it is difficult to imagine that camps of this nature, involving hundreds of terrorists with more than just small arms weapons, would be allowed to conduct their training on Iraqi soil if they posed a threat to the former regime. Instead, multiple attacks against local Kurdish officials seemed to be the directive of the group and in al Qaeda video terrorists were recorded attacking the Kurdish militia, a bitter enemy of Saddam regime.

Ansar al Islam's presence in Northern Iraq has been previously discussed on this site during the interview with General Michael DeLong and two posts on roundups of media stories on the issue.

These captures and kills demonstrate the ideological divide between “secular” Baathists and Islamic extremists was not so distant

Many analysts of the insurgency in Iraq are currently debating its makeup and strength, among other things. Regardless of what percentage is currently claiming allegiance to what ideology or group, the past few years of reporting have slowly revealed that at least one deadly aspect of the insurgency in Iraq has been the cooperation of some members of Saddam Hussein's regime (though not all) and Islamic militants, particularly al Qaeda in Iraq.

Below is a list, compiled from a number of media reports over the past few years, of the names and backgrounds of some of those found to have supported or worked for the former Baath Party of Saddam Hussein's Iraq and also al Qaeda. Parts of this list were cited by World Net Daily in a story about postwar links between members of Saddam Hussein's regime and al Qaeda elements in Iraq.

Muhammed Hila Hammad Ubaydi – Ubaydi, aka Abu Ayman, was the former aide to the Chief of Staff of Intelligence during the Saddam Hussein regime for 30 years. Ubaydi later led the Secret Islamic Army in the Northern Babil Province and was said to have had strong ties to the former terror leader Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi. He was captured April 6, 2006 in Southern Baghdad. MNF - Iraq

Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri – Al-Douri (pictured right) is the former vice chairman of Saddam's Baathist Revolutionary Command Council who swore fealty to Zarqawi and reportedly provided funding for al Qaeda and significant element of the Baathist/al Qaeda converts and collaborators. GlobalSecurity.org

Abdel Faith Isa – Isa is a former Iraqi Army officer who was later identified as an al Qaeda emir. He was captured May 6, 2004. Focus-Fen news, Bill Roggio, 5-09-06

Abu Abdullah Rashid al-Baghdadi - Al-Baghdadi is "believed to be a former officer in Saddam's army, or its elite Republican Guard, who (has) worked closely with al-Zarqawi since the overthrow of the Iraqi dictator in April 2003." Al-Baghdadi was among the candidates nominated as potential Abu Musab al Zarqawi's leadership position in al Qaeda in Iraq. Associated Press

Ahmad Hasan Kaka al-’Ubaydi – Al- Ubaydi was a former Iraqi Intelligence Service officer, and believed to have later become associated with al Qaeda affiliate Ansar Al Islam. CENTCOM

Abu Aseel – Aseel is a “former high ranking Saddam official” who was working with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi since 2002. Sami Moubayed, Asia Times, 6-13, 06

Abu Asim – Asim was a Special Republican Guard officer under Saddam Hussein and is said to have been active within the insurgency since the fall of the former regime, including association with Abu Musab al Zarqawi. MNF - Iraq

Abu Maysira al-Iraqi – Al-Iraqi was reportedly a “Minister of Information” for al Qaeda in Iraq and formerly an expert in Information Technology for Saddam Hussein’s Army. “He was an expert in Information Technology in Saddam's army and was entrusted with the additional task of waging the jihad through the Internet” for Abu Musab al Zarqawi’s al Qaeda in Iraq.” B. Raman

Abdul-Hadi al-Iraqi - Hadi al-Iraqi (pictured left) is now being held in Guantanamo Bay and was called “a top leader with al-Qaida in Iraq and the Mujahedeen Shura Council and originally comes from Nineveh province. He was a Major in Saddam Hussein's army but left to travel to Iraq to fight against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1990s” and was later identified as a “liason between Bin Laden and al Qaeda's leadership in Afghanistan, and the al Qaeda network formerly headed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq.” Al-Iraqi has also been cited as one of Osama bin Laden’s top al Qaeda commanders. NEWSWEEK

Unnamed Former Air Force Officer – A man who was killed in a coalition raid in Iraq “was later identified as a retired officer in the Iraqi Air Force serving under the Saddam Hussein regime. The male who initiated the gunfire is a suspected al-Qaeda terrorist for whom the troops were searching, as well as the retired officer’s son. The former officer was killed on April 14, 2006. MNF - Iraq

Abed Dawood Suleiman and son Raed Abed Dawood – Suleiman was a former Iraqi general believed to have become “Jordanian extremist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's ‘military adviser.’” Raed was a former Army captain in the Iraqi army and was caught April 15, 2005. News24

Mohammed Khalaf Shkarah al-Hamadani – Al-Hamadani, aka Abu Talha, was a key facilitator and financier for al Qaeda in Iraq. He was reportedly the head of an Abu Musab Al Zarqawi’s terror cell. Al-Hamadani was previously a member of Saddam Hussein’s once ruling Baath Party and a warrant officer in the former Iraqi army. Al-Hamadani was captured June 5, 2005. Associated Press

"Al-Hajji" Thamer Mubarak – Mubarak was a former Iraqi military officer turned key aide to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Mubarak was reportedly involved in the August 2003 al Qaeda attack on UN headquarters in Iraq. Evan Kohlman, Globalterroralert.com

Hasayn Ali Muzabir – Muzabir, a former Iraqi Intelligence (Mukhabarat) officer for Saddam Hussein’s regime, was later identified as al Qaeda's emir of Samarra. Muzabir was killed in Balad, Iraq on June 2, 2006. Department of Defense

Muhammad Hamza Zubaydi - Zubaydi (pictured right) was a "Baath Party official in charge of security in central Iraq and had helped put down an uprising by Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq in 1991." Zubaydi was later found to be an associate of Zarqawi's al Qaeda branch in Iraq. Washington Post

Abdul Hamid Mustafa al-Douri – Al-Douri was a relative of Saddam Hussein’s former aide Izzat al-Douri. As an aide to Abu Musab al Zarqawi, and head of the Salaheddin province al Qaeda branch and carbombing network, he was captured in a joint Iraqi police and army operation in a village in northern Tikrit. CNN

Haitham al-Badri - "Before joining al-Qaeda in Iraq, Badri was a warrant officer in the Special Republican Guard under Saddam Hussein. After the invasion, he joined the insurgent group Ansar al-Sunna, where he trained recruits and carried out attacks.” Washington Post

Salas Khabbas – Khabbas is "a former member of the Baath party and (was) closely linked with al-Qaeda.” Khabbas “specialized in attacking convoys and kidnapping." He was captured July 12, 2006 by Polish Intelligence agents. Polskie Radio

Abu Zubair – Zubair was trained in Iraq and was reportedly sent by Saddam Hussein’s government to lead “Supporters of Islam” into northern Iraq to assassinate leading Kurds and to assist in building chemical warfare facilities. Human Rights Watch citing UK government report

Rafid Fatah – Fatah, "also known as Abu Omer al-Kurdi, was also trained by Saddam and worked with (Abu) Zubair against the Kurds. It is not known when he left Iraq, but he too became a leading member of al-Qa'eda . His whereabouts are not known." UK Telegraph

Mohammed Hanoun Hamoud al-Mozani – Al-Mozani is a former Iraqi intelligence officer who was captured by police after bombings in Baghdad and Karbala. It was later revealed that he was paid by al-Qa'eda to carry out attacks on civilians. UK Telegraph

Hamed Jumaa Farid al-Saeedi – Al-Saeedi is a former member of Saddam Hussein's Intelligence Services who rose to #2 in al-Qaeda’s Iraq wing. Al-Saeedi reportedly “told interrogators that al-Qaeda in Iraq exchanges logistical support and information with supporters of Saddam Hussein.” Washington Post

Muharib Abdullah Latif al-Juburi – Al-Juburi was a Military Intelligence officer in Saddam Hussein’s army and later rose to a leading position for al Qaeda in Iraq. Al-Juburi also served as the “Information Minister” for the Islamic State of Iraq. All Headline News

Abu Mustafa – Mustafa was a Saddam Hussein era military officer (article cited by Ray Robison) who told TIME magazine that he spent his time in jail (post-invasion) "studying Salafi Islam and receiving lessons in jihad from bearded Iraqis and detainees who came from places like Syria and Saudi Arabia" before joining the jihadist fighters in Iraq. TIME

Abu Ali - (article cited by Ray Robison) Ali was “among those who have thrown their support behind the jihad...A ballistic-missile specialist in Saddam's Fedayeen militia, he fought U.S. troops during the invasion and has served as a resistance commander ever since, organizing rocket attacks on the green zone, the headquarters of the U.S. administration in Baghdad. When interviewed by TIME last fall, he spoke of a vain hope that Saddam would return and re-establish a Baathist regime.” TIME

Omar Hadid – Hadid, according to Middle East news outlets cited by Powerlineblog.com, was a former personal body guard of Saddam Hussein and had trained with al Qaeda in Afghanistan before fighting against coalition forces in Fallujah and elsewhere. Hadid, according to an al Qaeda biography after his death, also had a relative who was an official for Iraq's Intelligence Services and worked with Hadid on postwar operations. Evan Kohlman, Globalterroralert.com

A former Saddam Hussein officer was appointed as an al Qaeda leader to set up attacks on Iraqi oil sites in early 2007. Tactical Report

An unnamed former Saddam Fedayeen leader was later found to be an insurgent leader responsible for al Qaeda/foreign fighter camps in Syria. IraqSlogger, Bill Roggio.

Abu Raja - (article cited by Thomas Joscelyn) Raja hails from a family who was “well-connected” during Saddam Hussein’s rule and later joined forces with al Qaeda. The Atlantic

Abu Haydr - (article cited by Thomas Joscelyn) had an “important government job” before the invasion and later enlisted with al Qaeda. The Atlantic

A group of former Iraqi Republican Guard officers has reportedly been “giving ground-to-ground missiles, including Scud-B and Hossein missiles” and collaborating with al Qaeda to launch attacks on key targets in Iraq. Tactical Report

Adullah Rahman al-Shamary - Al-Shamary “was an officer in its (Iraq’s) feared Mukhabarat General, an intelligence service run by Saddam’s son, Qusay.” Al-Shamary told Richard Miniter, from a prison cell, that Qusay Hussein “oversaw the Mukhabarat’s relationship with Jund al-Islam, an al Qaeda wing operating in Northern Iraq before the 2003 American invasion” and he was involved in the Jund al-Islam-Mukhabarat relationship. Richard Miniter

Yasser al-Sabawi – Al-Sabawi is Saddam Hussein’s nephew and was reportedly linked to a Saddam Fedayeen cell arrested for being involved in the al Qaeda/al Zarqawi beheading of Nicholas Berg. The video of the beheading was posted on al Qaeda linked website and Berg may have been kidnapped by the al-Sabawi’s cell and then sold to Zarqawi’s group. Associated Press, MSNBC

A former Colonel in Saddam Hussein’s army was said to have later become the leader of al Qaeda’s branch in the Diyala province of Iraq. Melik Kaylan

Haydar al-Shammari – (may be the same person as Adullah Rahman al-Shamary)Al- Shammari is a former Iraqi Intelligence Officer who claimed that his Commander, Abu Wa’il, ordered him to aid al Qaeda members fleeing Afghanistan to enter Iraq through Jordan and Syria. Al-Shammari then assisted their mission in joining up with Ansar al Islam. Christopher Brown citing Al Sharq Al Awsat

Abu Iman al-Baghdadi – Al-Baghdadi (pictured left) told BBC news that Saddam Hussein’s Intelligence services were assisting al Qaeda affiliate Ansar al Islam with arms to counter the PUK and al-Baghdadi was checking on Abu Wa’il status in assisting the group. BBC

85 fighters were killed, though many escaped, when a joint Baath/al Qaeda camp was confronted by Iraqi forces in March 2005. General Adnan Thabet said the camp was “frequented by members of Saddam Hussein's Baath party and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's branch of Al Qaeda, was built after the US offensive to retake the rebel enclave of Fallujah in November. "They were Zarqawi followers and Baathists from the old military because they knew how to fight. They fought like old soldiers." ABC

The Islamic Army in Iraq – The Islamic Army in Iraq is an insurgent group that includes former members of Saddam Hussein’s Baath party, Muslim Brotherhood members and worked w