ABC: Report Shows No Link Between Saddam and al Qaeda
New York Times: Study Finds No Qaeda-Hussein Tie CNN: Hussein's Iraq and al Qaeda not linked, Pentagon says Washington Post: Study Discounts Hussein, Al-Qaeda Link AFP: No link between Saddam and Al-Qaeda: Pentagon study

The backbone of the insurgency appears to be an alliance between the die-hard Baathists and the network of terrorists mostly under the command of Abu Musab Zarqawi.

Feb. 11, 2003: Bin Laden tells his followers to help Saddam Hussein fight Americans in an audiotape broadcast on Al-Jazeera. U.S. officials say they believe the tape to be authentic

Investigator: What organization do you belong to? Abed: Ansar Al-Islam. Investigator: What organization is this? Abed: It is Bin-Laden’s group. ON BIN LADEN’S AL-QAEDA TRAINING CAMPS IN FALLUJAH UNDER SADDAM: Abed: Our Ansar Al-Islam military camps were in Halabja. Investigator: This was in the days of the previous regime? Abed: Yes. Investigator: And now? Abed: Now, there is nothing. They were all scattered. The training area was in Falluja.

the 9/11 Commission noted that there were "indications" that Saddam's regime "tolerated and may even have helped" Ansar al Islam - the group Abed admitted belonging to -set up shop in Saddam's Iraq. The Commission decided not to get into the details of what these "indications" were, but clearly the CIA was piecing together these threads of evidence prior to the U.S.-led invasion. The 9/11 Commission also noted that bin Laden "is said to have asked for space to establish training camps" as early as 1994 or 1995. The Commission said "there is no evidence that Iraq responded to this request." But, that isn't true - at least it isn't now true anyway.

I said the covert nature of the relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda made it difficult to know its full extent; al-Qaeda's security precautions and Iraq's need to cloak its activities with terrorist networks precluded a full appreciation of their relationship.

A more complete understanding of Iraq's relationship with al-Qaeda will emerge when historians can exploit the numerous seized documents free from the politics of the Iraq war.

I know that people who listen to me might think that Saddam Hussein has become apathetic in prison and stopped supporting terrorism. No. I’m not ashamed to tell you that Iraq, without Saddam Hussein, isn’t worth two bits. Therefore, it will make me happy if Iraq turns into dust.

One of the most interesting revelations in this book is Allawi's account of the emergence of Arab Sunni radicalism in Iraq. He (Allawi) shows that the first Jihadi groups were patronized by Saddam to counter-balance Shi'ite influence from Iran. Saddam may not have entered into a formal alliance with Al Qaeda. However, as Allawi shows, he was in league with Al Qaeda-style Jihadis, such as Jund al-Islam (Army of Islam) and Ansar al-Islam (Victors of Islam), for a decade before he was toppled.

"You are low infidels and scum. You Shiites are dogs. You are scum, to be trodden underfoot. From Moqtada Sadr to Hassan Nasrallah, all your leaders are dogs and scum. Do not think that the death of Saddam will save you. We will deter you with terrorism here inside Australia. "We will destroy the newspaper’s headquarters in Sydney very soon, God willing. We will destroy the newspaper’s headquarters in Melbourne. You will be butchered. Every Iraqi Kurd and Shiite in Australia will be butchered. I promise you in the name of Al-Qaida. You will be trodden on with shoes, you dogs. "Has the death of the President, the martyr, the living leader and hero who will never die, Saddam Hussein, a lesson for you? Do you want to savage the Sunnis, you dogs? I say to you, and repeat and reiterate, do not forget that one day we will take revenge, God willing, by liquidating the dog, Moqtada Sadr, who visited America and gave up Saddam. "You are dogs, you are scum, you are filthy, you are the lowest people on the face of earth. Your writers and correspondents are scum. I have all their names. I will uncover their addressees my own way, through our well-structured organisation in Melbourne and Sydney."

Even the remnants of his (Hussein's) old regime, which had morphed into the Sunni insurgency, seemed to lose their fervor for Saddam (after his capture). Some Ba'athist groups kept up the charade that they were fighting to restore the dictator to his palace, but others quickly stopped referring to him at all and instead recast themselves as "the nationalist resistance" or as "mujahedin," or holy warriors. Many threw in their lot with the new ogre on the scene, Al-Qaeda's Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

One afternoon last October, I watched the televised Saddam trial in the company of Abu Hamza, a field commander of Jaish al-Islami. Iraq's largest insurgent group, Jaish al-Islami is made up mainly of Ba'athists and soldiers from Saddam's army. Abu Hamza had been an officer in Saddam's elite Republican Guard; in previous meetings, he had spoken reverentially about the dictator, describing him as a man who exuded power and gravitas.